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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's explosive population increase over the last few decades has
necessitated a new outlook on how state and local governments plan for and
control their future. With the many different types of land within the state,
the need for an overall coherent plan, which provides for the needs of each
locality, is obvious. In response to this issue, the Florida Legislature
adopted the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Regulation Act ("Act").'
One of the major legal doctrines arising in the context of the Act is the
law of concurrency. Concurrency is "land use regulation which controls the
timing of property development and population growth. Its purpose is to
ensure that certain types of public facilities and services needed to serve
new residents are constructed and made available contemporaneously with
the impact of new development."2 It has been described as the "teeth" of
Florida's growth management system.3 In other words, concurrency
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3243 (1995).
2. H. Glenn Boggs, II & Robert C. Apgar, Concurrency and Growth Management: A
Lawyer's Primer, 7 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1, 1 (1991) [hereinafter Boggs & Apgar].
3. Id.
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regulations set minimums for developments as to what public service
infrastructure must be in place, or planned to be in place, to compensate for
the burdensome impact caused by the new development. These concurrency
requirements are set forth in the Florida Statutes.
4
This article will begin by examining the history and development of the
law of concurrency in Florida which includes an overview of the relevant
Florida Statutes. Part II will follow with a detailed analysis of the landmark
case of Golden v. Planning Board.5 From this decision, the emphasis will
turn to Florida case law of the taking remedy and how it applies to the law
of concurrency. Finally, this paper will conclude with a discussion of the
problem of overcrowded schools plaguing Florida, and the possibility of
adding a mandatory capital school element to Florida's concurrency law.
II. HISTORY
During the early years of Florida's population explosion of the 1950s
and 1960s, little was done by the Florida Legislature to regulate land use on
a state-wide basis.6 Instead, the state relied on the municipalities' authority
to exercise their police power to regulate local land use.' However, in
1969, the Florida Legislature attempted to create more consistency in land
use decisions by giving local governments the option to participate in
comprehensive land use planning, but it did so without providing state-
sponsored funding to finance the initiative! Without this funding, uniform
land use controls were slow to develop and as late as 1973, "two-thirds of
the state had no land use controls whatsoever and ad hoc decision-making,
regarding development, predominated throughout the state." 9
In 1972, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Environmental
Land and Water Act."° With it came the creation of the "Critical Area"
program and the "Development of Regional Impact" program, two state-run
4. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180.
5. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
6. Boggs & Apgar, supra note 2, at 3.
7. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (authorizing use of police power to restrict use of land); see also Cooper v.
Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702, 705 (Fla.) (holding land use regulation adopted municipality to be
valid as a "reasonable exercise of police power"), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
8. Boggs & Apgar, supra note 2, at 3 (quoting Terrell K. Arline, The Consistency
Mandate of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act, 55 FLA. B.J. 661, 661 (Oct.
1981)).
9. Id.
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (1972).
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programs designed to monitor Florida's local growth management and land
use regulation in certain areas of "critical concern" and major develop-
ment." Through these programs, the state gained valuable insight into the
impact of development on local infrastructure. It used this insight to
develop initiatives designed to coordinate development with the implementa-
tion of municipal services and facilities. 2 These initiatives were later
reflected in the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Regulation Act.'
3
Arising from the efforts of the legislature to address these land use
regulations problems, Florida passed the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning Act in 1975." This statute required every local government in
Florida to "adopt and implement a comprehensive plan to guide and control
future development."' 5  The statute did not, however, set forth any
"concurrency" requirements. It did, however, provide that any land use
regulations adopted or amended by a Florida municipality must be consistent
with the state's adopted comprehensive plan.'
6
In 1985, following a substantial overhaul of the state's growth
management section of the statutes, the legislature renamed the Act as the
"Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development
Regulation Act" ("1985 Act"). 7 The 1985 Act provided that each of the
municipalities adopt a comprehensive plan and submit it to the state for
approval, 8 and its adopted local plans must comply with the State
Comprehensive Plan ("Plan").' 9 It further defined and distinguished the
state's and the municipality's authority and responsibilities.2° In addition,
the legislature added provisions making it possible for any "aggrieved or
adversely affected party" to challenge the validity of the local comprehen-
sive plan, the land development regulations, and the local government
development orders.2' The 1985 Act required the local plan to include a
capital improvements element and an established level of service standard
11. Boggs & Apgar, supra note 2, at 4 nn.19-20.
12. I at 4.
13. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161.
14. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257.
15. Boggs & Apgar, supra note 2, at 5 (quoting Arline, supra note 8, at 661).
16. I
17. Ch. 85-55, § 1, 1985 Fa. Laws 207, 207 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 163.3161
(1995)).
18. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184.
19. Id. § 163.3177.
20. Id § 163.3167(1).
21. IM § 163.3215.
1996]
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for certain public facilities and services.' The 1985 Act also prohibited
local governments from issuing a development order for any development
which would reduce the number of available public service facilities to a
level below the minimums set by the comprehensive plan.23
The Plan' was enacted to preserve the state's natural resources and
enhance the quality of life by directing development to areas which already
have in place, or have agreements to provide, "the land and water resources,
fiscal abilities, and service capacity to accommodate growth in an environ-
mentally acceptable manner. '2' The Plan provides that existing facilities
should be preserved and that new facilities be planned for and financed "to
serve residents in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner."26 The 1985
Act, working in conjunction with the State Comprehensive Plan, seemed to
accomplish the overall goal of increasing the consistency of land use
planning decisions in the state, while still reserving some discretion for each
locality. Thus, with this legislation came Florida's foundation for stability
in land use decisions as well as an opportunity for growth in a more
responsible and efficient manner.
Although the 1985 Act clearly seemed to require a certain level of
"concurrency," the term itself was not expressed in the statutes until it was
included in the 1986 amendment's legislative "intent" language:
It is the intent of the Legislature that public facilities and services
needed to support development shall be available concurrent with the
impacts of such development .... In meeting this intent, public
facility and service availability shall be deemed sufficient if the public
facilities and services for a development are phased, or the development
is phased, so that the public facilities and those related services which
are deemed necessary by the local government to operate the facilities
necessitated by that development are available concurrent with the
impacts of the development.27
While this newly adopted language sheds some light on the legislature's
intentions implicit in the two sections of the statutes, it left some confusion
as to the specific requisite public services. Because of this, the Department
22. d. § 163.3177(3)(a).
23. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(2)(g).
24. See FLA. STAT. §§ 187.101-.201 (1995).
25. I § 187.201(16)(a).
26. IU § 187.201(18)(a).
27. d § 163.3177(10)(h) (1986) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 20
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of Community Affairs ("DCA")28 was left to develop the concurrency
doctrine through its interpretation of local land use regulations.
Much of the law of concurrency, as interpreted by the DCA, was
confirmed by the legislature in 1993.29 The legislature provided that, as
a matter of state law, concurrency applies to seven forms of public
infrastructure: 1) potable water; 2) sanitary sewer; 3) solid waste; 4)
drainage; 5) parks and recreation facilities; 6) roads; and in certain
jurisdictions, 7) mass transit.30 In other words, these are the only public
services which must comply with the minimum level of service standards set
forth in the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Develop-
ment Regulation Act before a municipality may issue a development order.
III. CASE LAW
A. Golden v. Planning Board
Several years prior to Florida's adoption of the Local Government
Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, a small
town in New York adopted an ordinance outlining a specific plan to provide
for the capitalization and implementation of all public service facilities
within the town to be completed within an eighteen year period.3 To aid
in the construction of this plan, Ramapo conducted studies of the town's
"existing land uses, public facilities, transportation, industry and commerce,
housing needs and projected population trends" and these studies were
ultimately reflected in the plan.32 In essence, the Ramapo ordinance
imposed restrictions on residential development that corresponded to the
availability of the specified public service facilities.33 In other words, the
restriction effectively precluded landowners from developing their property
until the necessary municipal services were provided.
The ordinance required that in order to develop land in Ramapo,
developers must apply for and receive a "special permit" for new residential
28. This state agency, established by the Florida Environmental Land and Water
Management Act of 1972, ch. 72-317, §1, 1972 Fla. Laws 1162, 1162 (codified at FLA.
STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (1972)), was created to implement the Development of Regional
Impact program and made recommendations of specific statewide guidelines based on studies
of the impacts of development on the local environment. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(2) (1995).
29. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180.
30. Id. § 163.3180(1).
31. Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 294-95 (N.Y. 1972).
32. ld at 294.
33. Id- at 294-95.
1996]
5
Robertsons: Concurrency and Its Relation to Growth Management
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
development.34 To receive the "special permit," the proposed development
must have accrued a certain number of points based on the availability of
certain public-service facilities.35 Points were assigned to the proposed
development depending on its distance from requisite public service
facilities.36 The five required public facilities were: "(1) public sanitary
sewers or approved substitutes; (2) drainage facilities; (3) improved public
parks or recreation facilities, including public schools; (4) State, county, or
town roads--major, secondary or collector; and, (5) firehouses. 37
In Golden, a facial attack against the validity of the ordinance was
brought by property owners who were denied approval of an application for
a special permit to develop a subdivision on their property, because the city
lacked the time and money to provide necessary public services and
facilities at a pace commensurate with increased public need.3 ' Although
the special term sustained the ordinance, the appellate division treated the
proceeding as an action for declaratory judgment and reversed.39 The
decision was then appealed by the town to the Court of Appeals of New
York Court.n
The Court of Appeals of New York first noted that the ordinance was
designed with certain "savings and remedial" provisions to protect the
restrictions from being potentially unconstitutional for unreasonableness.41
For example, the planning board could issue special permits, vesting a
present right to develop at some future date when development is scheduled
to meet its minimum point criteria.42 Accordingly, these special permits
were assignable. The board also deemed improvements scheduled for
completion within one year complete and developers always had the option
of providing the necessary improvements themselves to meet the requisite
point minimums.43 Variances on point requirements were also available
upon application to the board so long as the variance would be consistent
with the ongoing plan.'
34. Id. at 295.
35. Il
36. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 295.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 301.
39. Golden v. Planning Bd., 324 N.Y.S.2d 178, 186 (App. Div. 1971).
40. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 291.
41. Id. at 296.
42. Id.
43. I4
44. Id.
[Vol. 20
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Notwithstanding these options to circumvent the restrictions imposed
by the ordinance, the landowners argued that these restrictions were intended
to control population growth within the town, and thus an ultra vires
objective of the zoning enabling legislation. The court of appeals disagreed,
however, stating that although there is no express authorization in the zoning
enabling legislation for the land use controls adopted:
The power to restrict and regulate conferred [by the Town Law] in-
cludes ... by way of necessary implication, the authority to direct the
growth of population for the purposes indicated, within the confines of
the township. It is the matrix of land use restrictions, common to each
of the enumerated powers and sanctioned goals, a necessary concomi-
tant to the municipalities' recognized authority to determine the lines
along which local development shall proceed, though it may divert it
from its natural course. 45
From this language, it appears that the court allows the town a
significant amount of leeway in exercising its zoning power. Further, by
deferring to the quasi-legislative nature of Ramapo's Planning Board, the
court is implying that the local government is best suited to establish
boundaries and guidelines for development, while still requiring that the
ordinance finds it basis within the perimeters of current zoning enabling
legislation.
The landowners' next argument was that recent shifts in population,
combined with inconsistent land use policies, resulted in distorted growth
patterns and undermined efforts in solving regional and state growth control
problems. 6 The court dealt with this argument by emphasizing the
seemingly obvious fact that undirected growth does not necessarily lead to
controlled growth patterns 7 The court reasoned that even if it did strike
the ordinance, as the landowners would have it do, the absence of such an
45. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 297.
46. l at 299. The state and regional growth control problems asserted by the
landowners included: pollution controls, adequate housing, and public transportation. Id
The Florida Legislature seemed to avoid this problem by adopting the State Comprehensive
Plan and requiring each municipality to adopt a comprehensive plan that conforms with it.
This conformity requirement creates consistency throughout the state and allows local
governments to have a real chance of controlling and alleviating some of the problems
purported by the landowners in the instant case.
47. Id at 300. Another common misconception is that adequate public service facilities
in a growing area are implemented as a matter of course.
1996]
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ordinance would not guarantee that problems of broad public interest would
be solved.48
For example, suppose that a community suddenly attracts an influx of
new citizens requiring new residential development and it has no land use
controls to delegate which public facilities must be in place and how they
should be placed in accordance with the population distribution. Suppose
further that the local government has only one fire truck available to the
entire community, and it is called to three different fires at the same time.
The community may be perfectly constructed so that a car can travel from
one side of the community to the other without delay, however, even if the
fire truck can get to the first fire immediately, the other two fires will have
burned the houses to the ground. If a community has a local comprehensive
plan which requires a certain number of fire stations be in place prior to, or
in conjunction with, new development then this disaster will not occur.
Consider another example involving public parks. Suppose that on a
beautiful fall afternoon a large number of the citizens decide to spend the
day at the community park. What if the local government has not provided
adequate park space under its comprehensive plan to handle all of its
citizens? Obviously, the local citizens will be subject to overcrowding and
all of the problems that accompany it.49 From the preceding examples, it
is obvious that land use controls, such as the ones adopted by the town of
Ramapo, serve distinct advantages and perhaps should be included in every
town's comprehensive plan.
The Golden court subjected the ordinance to rational basis scrutiny.
The court renewed its deference to the "considered deliberations" of the
plan's progenitors, deeming matters of land use and development particular-
ly suited to the "expertise of students of city and suburban planning and thus
well within the legislative prerogative." 50 Accordingly, the ordinance is
presumed to be a valid exercise of police power." Therefore, the burden
of proving the ordinance's unconstitutionality rests with the challengers to
prove that the ordinance fails to advance a legitimate state interest.5 2
It was agreed that the ordinance advanced legitimate zoning purposes
because it assured that any newly built residence would have adequate
public facilities. The landowners conceded that the zoning power,
48. Ud at 299-300.
49. Examples of overcrowding problems are: increased littering, traffic congestion in
and around the park, and injuries related to overcrowding within the park.
50. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 301.
51. Id.
52. 11
[Vol. 20
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incorporated by the ordinance, included reasonable restrictions on private
property, exacted to further a well-conceived plan and to benefit the public
welfare.53 However, they argued that this ordinance went too far, in that
the city was seeking to avoid the financial burden and responsibility of
providing public services when needed.'
The court upheld the ordinance.55 It reasoned that it is in "the nature
of all land use and development regulations to circumscribe the course of
growth within a particular town or district... [which] invariably impede the
forces of natural growth."'56 So long as the regulations are reasonable and
necessary to benefit the welfare of the community, such regulations have
been sustained. 7 The court put this "zoning ordinance" into context by
holding it to be "inextricably bound to the dynamics of community life and
[that] its function is to guide, not to isolate or facilitate efforts at avoiding
the ordinary incidents of growth."58 However, the court's determination
of a restriction's validity was determined based on its purpose and its
impacts on the community and the general public. The court concluded
that:
where it is clear that the existing physical and financial resources of the
community are inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities
which a substantial increase in population requires, there is a rational
basis for "phased growth" and hence, the challenged ordinance is not
violative of the Federal and State Constitutions. 9
Thus, the ordinance passed constitutional muster.
Due to the constitutional nature of the decision, authority to implement
such programs within a municipality's growth management scheme became
apparent under standard zoning enabling legislation.' However, the court
did not rule on the ordinance's validity as applied. Thus, while the authority
existed implicitly in standard zoning enabling legislation to adopt such an
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05.
56. Id. at 301 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 302.
59. Id. at 304-05. Ironically, the town of Ramapo was forced to abandon this plan due
to a series of natural disasters which overburdened its financial resources. DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT
612 (3d ed. 1990).
60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3243.
1996]
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ordinance, it seems that an aggrieved landholder may still challenge such
ordinance, as applied to his property, as an arbitrary and unreasonable
restriction. In other words, such regulations may not be used to mask an
exclusionary scheme such as preventing low income or minority groups
from moving into an area. It seems clear that such regulation would be
stricken. 1
B. Florida Law
1. Standard of Review
This author has discovered no current Florida appellate decisions which
have specifically ruled on the constitutionality of Florida's concurrency
statute. However, Florida appellate decisions, examining zoning regulations,
seem to indicate a strong tendency in favor of the validity of comprehensive
plans by requiring strict compliance.62 For instance, in Machado v.
Musgrove,63 where landowners sought to have their land rezoned to allow
for office buildings, the court held:
The test in reviewing a challenge to a zoning action on grounds
that a proposed project is inconsistent with the comprehensive land use
plan is whether the zoning authority's determination that a proposed
development conforms to each element and the objectives of the land
use plan is supported by competent and substantial evidence. The
traditional and non-deferential standard of strict judicial scrutiny
applies."4
Accordingly, the court placed the burden of proof on the party seeking
the zoning change to show that the proposed development strictly conforms
with the elements of the local comprehensive plan.6 ' Furthermore, in
determining whether the evidence provided by that party is actually
61. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (indicating where immediate
harm is suffered by members of minority group attempting to attain housing in an area which
they are illegally excluded, they may have standing to challenge zoning regulation). It is also
possible that such a regulation may be deemed as a taking of the landowner's property. See
discussion infra part III.B.2.-3.
62. E.g., White v. Metropolitan Dade County, 563 So. 2d 117, 128 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
63. 519 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 529 So. 2d 694 (Fla.
1988).
64. Id. at 632.
65. Id.
900 [Vol. 20
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consistent with the plan, the court required the stricter standard, not the
traditional "fairly debatable" standard.66 The court reasoned that to truly
be consistent with the plan, the regulation should not "deviate or depart in
any direction or degree" from the parameters set by the plan, and thus an
increased standard is necessary.67
In essence, this type of judicial scrutiny affords much respect to a local
comprehensive plan. By requiring strict conformity with each element of
the local comprehensive plan, and placing the burden of proving consistency
with the plan on the rezoning applicants, the court is implying that the plan
is an essential element of the growth management process not to be easily
overcome. More importantly, it seems to further expand a municipality's
authority to regulate zoning through its local comprehensive plan. The
plan's drafters already have the ability to (and presumably do) perform in-
depth studies of the community's land use and growth management
needs.61 Once they have evaluated these needs, they can incorporate
appropriate regulations in their comprehensive plan to help correct localized
problems. The state has thus provided the municipalities with a powerful
pen. However, by retaining the right to review each plan, the state has also
secured overall conformity. In so acting, the legislature has recognized
these plans as having the utmost significance in local land use decision-
making, which is a strong indication that local comprehensive plans are
valid.
This judicial approach toward local comprehensive plans by the court
makes sense. While some would argue that a strict type of scrutiny by the
courts is just another governmental intrusion further burdening the typical
landholder, the opposite may in fact be true. First, land use problems
typically arise at the local level. If land use regulations are controlled
strictly at the state level, adequate protection of local interests may not be
realized, and the burden on local landowners would seemingly increase.
Next, by allowing local governments to play an active role in land use
decision-making, specific locally-based problems may be addressed without
66. lIL at 633.
67. Id at 634 (quoting City of Cape Canaveral v. Mosher, 467 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1985)).
68. In Machado, Dade County's land use plan required a neighborhood area study to
guide where, when, what kind, and what amount of nonresidential uses would be allowed in
a specified residential zone. Machado, 519 So. 2d at 635. Dade's mandatory element of
neighborhood study solidified the implication in the Golden opinion that it is most suitable
to leave the details of a local land use plan to the "expertise of students of city and suburban
planning." Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 301.
1996]
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wasting state funds to research issues which are relevant only to a particular
locality. Similarly, local governments are saved from dealing with
burdensome regulations which should not have been applied to their area in
the first place. Accordingly, the resources saved by the local governments
may be better used to study and evaluate issues which are relevant to their
area.
Since a local comprehensive plan is specific to one area, and is tailored
by the people it affects the most, these plans should be firmly upheld.
Furthermore, when a municipality has discovered, researched, evaluated, and
adopted a plan to remedy a local land use problem, landowners should be
required to strictly comply with the program in order to give the program
a chance to succeed. Requiring such strict compliance is not unreasonable
because a landowner has other remedies available to challenge the
application of an ordinance to his property.69 Therefore, requiring .strict
conformity of a developer's compliance with the comprehensive land use
plan is a must for consistent and efficient land use regulation.
2. Takings
One of the most prominent challenges of land use regulations is that the
regulation constitutes a taking without just compensation. One of private
property's most fundamental protection is against its seizure for public use
without "just" and "full" compensation. The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, embodies this protection by prohibiting the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation." This principle may
also be found in the Florida Constitution which provides that "[n]o private
property shall be taken except for public purpose and with full compensation
therefor paid. ... "7
The question that arises from these provisions is how far does the
government have to go to have committed a taking. To answer this question
one must begin with one of the landmark cases in land use taking challeng-
es, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.7" In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme
Court was asked to determine whether Pennsylvania's Kohler Act was
constitutional because it was alleged to have destroyed certain contract and
69. An example of an alternative remedy is a taking claim. See discussion infra part
ILI.B.2.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
72. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
902 [Vol. 20
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property rights of a property owner protected by the Constitution."3 The
Court initially recognized that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law." 4 Accordingly, the Court held
that the general rule is, although "property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 5
Although not stated as such, the Court seemed to use a balancing test,
weighing the harm suffered by the property owner against the societal gain,
which requires an independent analysis of the facts and circumstances
relevant to each case. 6  Unfortunately, this rule does not provide a
concrete test upon which valid land use regulations may be distinguished
from invalid regulations.
In a more recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of the United
States Court of Appeals reversed a federal magistrate's decision that the
adoption of a comprehensive land use plan effectuated a taking against the
property owners entitling them to just compensation." The case involved
approximately forty acres of waterfront land which the property owners
sought to develop for single-family residences. However, in 1984, Lee
County adopted a comprehensive land use plan which classified the
Reahard's property as a "Resource Protection Area" and limited develop-
ment of the parcel to a single residence." The Reahards did not challenge
the plan's classification of their property, conceding that it was a valid
exercise of police power; however, they did allege that the classification
interfered with their reasonable investment-backed expectations entitling
them to monetary compensation. 9
As a threshold issue, the court noted that the monetary compensation
claim must be ripe for review.'O Specifically, the landowner must have
obtained a final decision regarding the application of the regulation to his
property, and he must have exhausted all state procedures available for
73. l at 412.
74. Id. at 413.
75. Id. at 415.
76. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(discussing balancing of interests in takings cases).
77. Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1693 (1995).
78. Id. at 1133.
79. Id. at 1135. It is interesting to note that the Reahards inherited the property from
Mr. Reahard's parents who were not parties to the suit. Id at 1133.
80. Id at 1135 n.7.
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obtaining just compensation."1 Once the threshold questions were satisfied,
the court employed the two tests to determine whether a land use regulation
is a taking. 2 First, the regulation must substantially advance a legitimate
state interest.83 Second, the regulation must not deny an owner all "econo-
mically viable use of his property." 4  The court bypassed the first test
because Reahard conceded that Lee County's comprehensive plan was a
valid exercise of police power which substantially advanced a legitimate
governmental interest.
The second test of whether the owner has been denied economically
viable use of his property is more difficult. The two factors that the court
determined must be analyzed by the fact finder are "(1) the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant; and (2) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with investment-backed expectations."8'5 The court remanded
the case for further proceedings to analyze the above factors.8 6
It would seem then that the two-part test as illustrated in Reahard,
provides us with the type of analysis which would be applied in a concur-
rency challenge. Concurrency regulations are essentially land use regula-
tions which can be so restrictive on a property as to render a taking. For
example, consider a situation in which a developer would like to construct
single-family residences on a forty-acre parcel of raw land, zoned residen-
tial. The municipality, in which the land is situated, has just adopted a
comprehensive land use plan in which one of its mandatory elements
requires that a public elementary school be located within two miles of
every new development. Unfortunately for our developer, though, the
nearest public elementary school is five miles away. Accordingly, the
developer's permit is denied. What is the developer to do now? Should she
have to build the school herself? What if there is no land within two miles
which would be suitable for an elementary school? Should she have to
dedicate part of her land for its construction? May she bring suit for a
taking?
81. Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1135 n.7.
82. These two tests originated in the opinion of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
83. Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1135 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834).
84. Ia
85. Id. at 1136 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606 (1986)). The court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case for new proceedings because the findings of fact by the
magistrate were insufficient to make a proper taking analysis. Id. at 1137.
86. This case was later vacated on ripeness grounds. See Reahard v. Lee County, 30
F.3d 1412 (1lth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995).
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If she challenges the ordinance as a taking without just compensation,
then according to the Reahard court the two part takings test will apply. 7
The first part of the test involves a determination of whether the concur-
rency regulation "substantially advances a legitimate state interest."8" The
state's "legitimate interest" in educating the children of the state is arguably
"substantially advanced" by the concurrency element requiring public
elementary schools to be located within two miles of the new development.
Thus, the first prong of the test should be satisfied.
The second prong requires that, for a taking to occur, the developer
must be denied all, or substantially all, economically viable use of her
property. She would claim that the regulation precludes her from building
any houses on it which happens to be its highest and best use and, therefore,
the regulation denies her the right to all economically viable use of her
property. However, the court would probably consider several factors
centering on the nature of the property itself. For instance, how has the land
previously been used? For what other uses could it be developed? What
is the history of its zoning? What were the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of the landowner?
In this hypothetical, the court will probably not deem the regulation a
taking because of the mere fact that the property owner could not put her
land to its highest and best use. So long as she can make some economical-
ly viable use of her property, there will be no taking. However, the
preceding factors must also be considered.
For example, suppose she purchased this forty acres while it was being
used as a private hunting ground. Notwithstanding its present use, because
the property's zoning classification allows single family residences to be
built, the change in the nature of its use alone does not present a problem.
However, the ordinance requiring the elementary school imposes a factor
which could substantially affect the value of the property. But, the
requirement itself does not change the nature of the property to the extent
that it precludes the development of new homes. Thus, it would be difficult
to establish a taking on this basis alone.
The history of the property's zoning is another important consideration
as well. Suppose the property has been zoned residential and subject to the
ordinance for several years, but the growth of the surrounding community
had only recently reached this property necessitating its development. It
would seem that the lack of development could be attributed to the lack of
87. Of course, she would first have to satisfy the threshold requirement by exbausing
all procedural options. See Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1135 n.7.
88. Id. at 1135.
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demand for new housing in the community, not the ordinance. However,
once the community's growth reaches the property, the ordinance will be a
significant factor in the property owner's decision of whether to build.
Similarly, if the property is zoned residential concurrent with the need
for new housing in the community, and the ordinance is in effect when the
property is purchased, then the regulation has not imposed any new burden.
Moreover, this ordinance should have been factored into the development
costs and the purchase price. Thus, if these considerations were ignored by
our developer, then her error could be financially devastating, and it would
be unlikely that the court would force the government to account for her
mistake via a taking.
Next, when considering a landowner's "reasonable investment-backed
expectations," the effect of the regulation on the property after it is passed
plays a very important role in the analysis. As previously indicated, if a
purchaser of land ignores existing regulations in his or her computation of
property value, the consequences could be financially devastating. However,
assuming our developer purchased the property prior to the ordinance's
adoption, the effect on her "reasonable investment-backed" expectations
generated by the ordinance must be determined.
Suppose she financed the property with a thirty-year amortized,
"interest-only" loan, with a balloon payment due in five years. It is quite
possible, that the county will not build an elementary school within the
requisite radius in the next five years. Accordingly, she will be unable to
develop her property in time to make her balloon payment. In other words,
the ordinance would preclude her from developing her property because
without the construction of the school, she will not be given a development
order; and as she is unable to develop her land, she will probably be unable
to meet her loan obligations. Consequently, if the ordinance was imposed
after she purchased (and financed) the property, her reasonable investment-
backed expectations presumably did not include factoring for the existence
of an elementary school. Thus, in this situation, her reasonable investment-
backed expectations appear to have been abrogated which bodes strongly in
favor of the premise that the government has imposed a taking of her
property.
Another factor to consider is the alternative development options
available to her. Obviously, she could continue to operate the property as
a private hunting ground, but this is not the reason she purchased it. One
option she may have, depending on road locations and the zoning classifica-
tions of the surrounding area, is to attempt to rezone the property or apply
for a variance. Secondly, she could hold the property until a school is built
[Vol. 20
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within the requisite radius, and then develop or sell at a higher price. 9 A
further option is for her to build the school herself. This, however, is a very
unlikely option due to the relatively small piece of land she is developing.
Considering the high cost of constructing a school, it is improbable that she
will be able to build enough homes on forty acres so that she could allocate
the school's cost into the purchase price of each new home and still make
a profit. On the other hand, if a developer purchases one thousand acres to
develop single family homes, it seems much more probable that he will have
the resources necessary to construct the school(s), and that, due to the
volume of homes that can be built on one thousand acres, he could allocate
the cost of the school(s) into the purchase price of each new home and still
realize a profit.
In sum, when purchasing a piece of property, it is important for the
developer to consider all regulations which currently affect the property and
all possible development alternatives, because that is what a "reasonable"
developer would do if he or she expects to make a profit; and perhaps most
importantly, that is what a court will consider in determining the developer's
"reasonable investment-backed expectations."
Next, suppose that the municipality has recently allocated capital
expenditures in its long-term budget for the school to be built five years
from now, and the property is otherwise in compliance with all concurrency
requirements. May she commence with her development? Should she have
to wait an interim period? What if the budget included no time frame of
when the school would be built? How long would be reasonable? These
questions involve temporary takings as discussed in the next section.
3. Temporary Takings
The leading Supreme Court case in this area is First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.9' In this case,
89. However, due to the substantial risks involved, such as the county not building a
school, this is probably not an advisable action. Arguably, though, if the school is built, the
property value will rise as there is one less hurdle to overcome in the development process.
Accordingly, she could realize a profit by selling the property if she is willing to take the risk
of playing the "waiting-game." If, however, the ordinance was not in existence when she
bought the property, then it was presumably not a factor in the purchase price. Thus, once
the school is built (after the adoption of the ordinance), the value of the property (everything
else remaining the same) should equal her purchase price, and she will break even. The
"waiting-game" option, in the opinion of the author, is a very risky one and not advisable
to the "reasonable" developer.
90. 482 U.S. 304 (1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
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the church owned land in a canyon along the banks of a natural drainage
channel for a watershed area which it used as a retreat known as "Luther-
glen." Much of the watershed area burned in a forest fire creating a serious
flood risk. Such flooding soon occurred destroying the entire site.
Consequently, Los Angeles County enacted an ordinance prohibiting
construction or improvements on property located within the outer boundary
lines of the interim flood protection area, which encompassed Lutherglen,
to prevent further loss of property or life.91
The church filed suit against the county claiming, inter alia, that the
ordinance denied the church of all use of its "Lutherglen" property.92 The
issue which ultimately arose was whether the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay for "temporary"
regulatory takings.93 Specifically, the Court had to decide whether, when
an ordinance denies a property owner all use of its property and the
ordinance has yet to be declared unconstitutional, the government must
compensate the landowner from the initial point of deprivation.94
The Court initially examined the relevant language of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution: "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation."95 Indicative in this
language, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit takings of property;
however, it does condition such governmental action on the provision of
"just compensation" being paid to the affected landholder.96 It also noted
that the Fifth Amendment was not designed to limit valid governmental
interference in private property rights.97
The Court restated the general rule laid down in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." 98 Furthermore, when enforcing
such a valid regulation, the government should not force individual property
owners to "bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
91. ld at 307.
92. Id. at 308.
93. Id at 314.
94. Id. at 312. The court does not actually answer the questions of whether the property
owner was denied all use of the land or whether the ordinance was unconstitutional. It
merely determines whether such a remedy exists. First English, 482 U.S. at 312.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. First English, 482 U.S. at 314-15.
97. Id. at 315.
98. Id at 316 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
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borne by the public as a whole."99 It seems, then, that regulations imposed
on land will not be deemed a taking so long as they are reasonable.
However, once a taking has been established, the government still has
the ability to amend the ordinance, repeal it, or actually pay just compensa-
tion. But merely exercising its ability to amend or repeal the ordinance does
not eliminate the fact that the property was subject to a "taking" while the
ordinance was in effect. Accordingly, the First English Court held that once
an ordinance has been found to effect a "taking of all use of property, no
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."' °
This decision has been followed by the state and federal courts in
Florida. In Villas of Lake Jackson v. Leon County,'' the district court
ruled that the Florida courts have construed the First English decision as
mandating a compensation remedy for cases to the extent that a taking has
been found to result from the enforcement of a confiscatory ordinance."
It concluded that after First English, "it is now certain that a property owner
in Florida has a state remedy for compensation for the period of the taking
until the regulation is amended or withdrawn."' 3
Similarly, in J.T. Glisson v. Alachua County,"° the court upheld the
constitutionality of an amendment to Alachua County's Comprehensive Plan
which placed significant development restrictions on certain environmentally
sensitive property owned by the appellants. 5 The court stated that for a
landowner to show that a taking exists, he must have "no available
beneficial use of his property under the land use ordinance."'' 6 Moreover,
the court cited First English when it noted that once *a taking is found the
government has a duty to compensate an aggrieved landowner for the period
that his property was affected by the ordinance, even if the ordinance is
repealed.' ° Accordingly, it seems clear that a remedy for a temporary
99. l- at 319 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
100. Id. at 321.
101. 796 F. Supp. 1477 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
102. Id, at 1482.
103. Id. at 1483.
104. 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla.
1990).
105. Id. at 1032-33, 1038.
106. Id. at 1036 (citing Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830
F.2d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 1987)).
107. Id. (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 321). The court treated this case as a facial
challenge, however, because the property owners had not satisfied the threshold issue of
ripeness. The record reflected that "no individual appellant-landowner ha[d] applied for or
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taking exists in Florida, and may therefore be used when challenging a
concurrency regulation. Thus, to successfully challenge a concurrency
regulation via a takings claim, the landowner must demonstrate to the court
that the regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental
interest or that the ordinance denies him all economically viable use of his
property.
By applying the rationale of the above decisions to our hypothetical,
the first question to ask in challenging the ordinance is whether, by not
making a provision for the construction of an elementary school within a
reasonable period of time, the municipality has effected a taking against the
developer. Assuming that it has effected a taking, and the municipality does
not amend or repeal the ordinance, the municipality must pay the developer
the reasonable value for the use of all her property.
However, once the city amends its budget to provide for the construc-
tion of the school, the question is, how much of a delay to the developer
before a development order is issued is reasonable? The case law seems to
indicate that this question will be answered on a case by case basis,
depending on the circumstances.'O' If the delay is determined to be
unreasonable, then there is at least a temporary taking and the government
must pay just compensation for the period beginning with when the
regulation took effect against our developer's property. However, if the
delay is deemed reasonable, then no taking has occurred and she is entitled
to no compensation.
C. "Even-Swap"-A Landowner's Option to Circumvent
Concurrency?
A new option available to a landowner in the concurrency context has
reared its head and requires the landowner to bargain with government
officials in order to gain development rights. An example of this is seen in
Jacksonville in a "swap" made between the city and a family owning several
hundred acres within the city." In exchange for the city crediting four
been denied a development proposal, rezoning request, or variance from the development
regulation[s]" since the adoption of the amendment. Id. at 1036. See generally City of
Jacksonville v. Wynn, 650 So. 2d 182, 187-88 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
landowner must obtain final judgment regarding application of challenged ordinance to
property and must utilize all state procedures providing relief for a taking without
compensation, before inverse condemnation claim is ripe for review).
108. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 302 (N.Y. 1972).
109. Kathy Horak, Skinners Give City 150 Acres, BuS. J.-JACKSONVILLE, Nov. 26, 1993,
available in WL, ALLNEWS Directory, 1993 WL 3026987.
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thousand vehicle trips on "busy" nearby roads to a 460 acre parcel of
undeveloped land owned by the family, the family donated a 150-acre piece
of property to the city as right-of-way for the extension of a state road.110
Although this family had no immediate plans to develop the 460 acres, the
property's value was increased and it was easier for them to sell the
property to a developer as an important concurrency requirement was now
satisfied.'
This does not appear to be an isolated incident. This family alone had
several other similar deals planned with the city, and apparently has set a
precedent because many other landowners are freely negotiating with the
city to bargain for development rights."
2
This type of bargaining seems to directly contradict the intent of the
legislature in adopting the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Act ("the Act")." 3  To illustrate, if the purpose of
concurrency is to time the growth of development to the government's
provision of certain facilities and services, i.e., roads, then how is this
purpose furthered by allowing a property owner to develop property that
does not have roads capable to support the increase in traffic? Increasing
the capacity of roads in another area seems to condone a theory of "no-net-
increase" to the overall usage of the city's roads; however, it does not seem
wise or synonymous with the Act's intent to sacrifice the resources of one
area of the city merely to benefit another area of the city.
Suppose, for example, that a property owner wants to develop a certain
piece of property and the roads supporting it are capable of a capacity of up
to 5000 "trips ' " 4 attributable to this property. If the property owner's
proposed development will create 10,000 trips, then the development order
will presumably not be issued until the roads are capable of handling the
extra 5000 trips. Suppose instead that the landowner donated a piece of
property to the city on the other side of town for the construction of a new
road which will have no effect on the capacity of the roads supporting the
proposed development in exchange for a credit of 5000 trips being allocated
to his development. He is now free to secure a development order
(assuming all other permit obstacles are met) even though the surrounding
roads will be subject to double their intended capacity.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (1995).
114. For example, one single family home could be classified as creating 2.5 "trips."
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This option does not make sense to this author. We cannot allow one
part of the city to benefit at the expense of another part of the city and still
maintain consistency with a local comprehensive plan. Even if the city
officials claim that their actions were in conformity with the local compre-
hensive plan, who is to be the judge? Can we really expect the general
public, in a public hearing, to be able to distinguish between the pitfalls of
a "no net-increase" in overall usage and the statute's true intent, that each
area of the community be treated consistently and in conformity with the
local comprehensive plan?"'5 What if the area which will suffer is
composed of citizens unable to afford adequate representation while the area
which will benefit is composed of affluent citizens able to afford the best
representation?
D. Should the State Impose a Mandatory Concurrency Element
for Schools?
Due to the continuing population growth of Florida, several school
systems throughout the state have been forced to consider several alterna-
tives to counter-act the effects of over-crowding in schools." 6 Many
options have been suggested, ranging from increasing sales taxes to
scheduling school days in double sessions."7 Perhaps the most dynamic
suggested alternative would be to include schools as a mandatory element
in the state's concurrency requirements. The problem this brings, though,
is who pays for these new schools?
One possibility, which has been proposed in Pasco County, entails the
exaction of school impact fees being imposed against the development of
any new homes."' In general, this would entail a fee being charged for
the construction of new homes; and such fees would be earmarked
115. It is entirely possible that a trade for development rights could be in conformity
with the local comprehensive plan, but there should be a clear relationship between the
private and governmental action. In other words, the compensation given to the city in
exchange for development rights should have a direct relationship with the benefit to the
immediate community. For example, if in the Jacksonville example, the land donated by the
family would have extended a highway to compensate for the increased travel created by
developing that property, then the exchange would seem to be justified.
116. Peter Mitchell, After Funding Setbacks, Schools Prepare Painful Lessons for
Parents, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at Fl, available in WL, ALLNEWS Directory, 1995
WL-WSJ 9907304.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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specifically for the construction of new schools necessitated by the new
development." 9 This proposal, however, is not a novel one.
In St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n,"1 ' the court
considered "whether St. Johns County could impose an impact fee on new
residential construction to be used for new school facilities."'' After
conducting a careful study calculating how to maintain an acceptable level
of public facilities in the county, including schools, a method of allocating
the cost of providing these new school facilities to each unit of new
residential development was proposed. " Incorporating this proposal, an
ordinance was enacted which specified that:
no new building permits will be issued except upon the payment of an
impact fee. The fees are to be placed in a trust fund to be spent by the
school board solely to "acquire, construct, expand and equip the
educational sites and educational capital facilities necessitated by newdevelopment. ' 3
The ordinance recited that it would be applicable within both incorpo-
rated and unincorporated areas of the county, but not in municipalities in
which an interlocal agreement to collect the impact fees had not been
entered into with the County.
To determine whether the imposition of this impact fee was valid, the
court invoked the "dual rational nexus test."'" As the name indicates, two
requirements must be satisfied:
There must be a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the
need for additional capital facilities and the growth in population
generated by the subdivision. In addition, the government must show
a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of
the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision. In
order to satisfy this later requirement, the ordinance must specifically
119. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 320 (Fla.
1976) (authorizing municipality to exact impact fees to meet proportion of costs of expanding
public facilities attributable to new development, so long as fees are limited to meeting costs
of expansion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
120. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
121. Id. at 636. This is an issue of first impression for the court. ICE at 638.
122. Id. at 637.
123. Id. (quoting ST. JOHNS CoUNTY, FLA., ORDNANCE 87-60, § 10(B) (1987)).
124. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637.
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earmark the funds collected for use in acquiring capital facilities to
benefit the new residents."
The court, in considering the first prong of the test, determined whether
St. Johns County demonstrated that there was a reasonable connection
between the need for more schools and the growth in population attributable
to the new development. 26 The parties did not dispute that the county
must expand its facilities commensurate with the rate of new development
to maintain its current levels of service. 7 However, the challengers to
the ordinance argued that not all new residents will have children who will
benefit from the new schools. The court countered this argument by
pointing out that even though benefits from fire protection and parks will
not be used by every citizen, the city must still be in the position to serve
every dwelling unit.129 Thus, the court held that the ordinance met the
first prong of the rational nexus test.1
30
However, the court determined that the second prong of the test was
not met because the ordinance did not specifically earmark the funds
collected for use in acquiring capital facilities strictly to benefit the new
residents who actually paid the fees. 3 ' In other words, there was no
express provision in the ordinance ensuring that the impact fees would be
kept from being spent for the construction of new schools to accommodate
new development in municipalities which have not entered into the interlocal
agreement. 32 For example, if a municipality within the county chose not
to impose this impact fee on its citizens by not entering into a collection
agreement with the county, then under the ordinance, it is entirely possible
that fees collected in another part of the county will be spent to build a new
school in the municipality which is exempt from the impact fees. This
possibility, the court decided, was not acceptable. Consequently, it held that
no impact fees could be collected under this ordinance until "substantially
all of the population of St. Johns County is subject to the ordinance.' '133
The St. Johns County ordinance also included a provision that
essentially allowed a development to be exempt from the impact fee if it
125. Id.
126. Id. at 638.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 638.
130. Id. at 639.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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could show that it would be comprised totally of families without children
attending public schools, that is, families with children attending private
schools only, families without children, adult communities, etc."M
However, due to the requirement that these families would have to pay the
impact fees if they subsequently have children who will attend public
schools while residing in their homes, the court determined that the impact
fees had the potential of being "user fees" in that the fees seemed to be
based solely on whether any children attending public schools resided on the
property. 35 Thus, invoking the severability clause, the court struck this
provision from the ordinance, because the court determined that imposing
"user fees" on public education collides with Florida's constitutional
requirement 136 of free public schools) 31
It seems that the St. Johns ordinance failed on a mere technicality.
However, by imposing this strict test, the court insured that impact fees may
not be imposed at the whim of government officials. Ironically, instead of
attempting to accommodate every party who "perhaps" should not be subject
to the fee, if the County would have been more aggressive in drafting the
ordinance, i.e., eliminating the exceptions and requiring no interlocal
agreements, the ordinance apparently would have survived. From this
opinion, however, it seems clear that impact fees earmarked for construction
of new schools to keep up with the demands caused by new development
may be exacted against new home construction with a carefully drafted
ordinance.
Although this decision seems to have provided a supplementary means
of providing revenue to construct new schools, it did not solve the potential
for intergovernmental conflicts. As pointed out by C. Allen Watts, if
municipal consent is required to impose a county-wide school impact fee,
then a 51 percent majority of a small municipality's voters could effectively
veto this type of fee county-wide. 3' However, if there is no procedure for
collecting the fees, then the government will not receive the revenue. Thus,
134. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640.
135. Id.
136. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
137. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640. The court did note that it would have no
problem with an exemption for residential adult facilities in which land use restrictions were
placed on the property that prohibited minors from residing within the community. Id. at 640
n.6.
138. C. Allen Watts, Beyond User Fees? Impact Fees for Schools and.... 66 FLA. BJ.
56, 59 (Feb. 1992).
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there must be a next step. Is this next step a state-wide mandate for schools
as a mandatory concurrency element?
IV. CONCLUSION
It is quite apparent that Florida's Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act is appropriately named.
The substance embodied from its original form and subsequent amendments
reflect many years of study, experience, and planning. As a state growing
at such an explosive pace, land use controls are imperative to Florida and
its government officials. The legislature has provided a means by which
each local government entity is assured of its ability to diagnose a problem
and remedy it according to its individual needs. At the same time, however,
Florida as a whole is assured of consistency and uniformity throughout its
land use decisions.
The legislature has mandated that certain elements be included in each
local government's comprehensive plan. Of course, this does not preclude
a plan from including other elements not in the state's plan. Rather, the
plan must merely be consistent with it. Presumably, the mandatory elements
found in Florida's concurrency statute 139 are what the legislature has
determined to be absolutely necessary on a statewide basis for a communi-
ty's health, benefit, and welfare. However, as with anything else, with
changing conditions comes changing needs. Thus, the logical reason the
legislature withheld some control over local comprehensive plans is so that
it retains the ability to make changes whenever a statewide need arises.
It is becoming all too obvious that the conventional approach of hoping
that government will expand its facilities in time with the needs of the
community is not working."4 It seems that it is time for the legislature
to look at this problem and consider the concurrency alternative. Although
concurrency regulations have been criticized as overly bureaucratic and
time-consuming for the developer, should the prospect of our children's
139. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180.
140. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 116. A sign at Suntree Elementary School in
Melbourne, Florida warns newcomers to the area that this new school is overcrowded and
enrollment is capped so any new students must be bused to other schools. The school district
in Broward County, Florida is forced to consider a year-round calendar, double sessions,
busing students to distant schools, and hauling in portable classrooms to be placed on playing
fields and parking lots due to a growth of 10,000 students per year. The school district in
Leon County, Florida, by redrawing boundaries to ease school overcrowding, could mean
eliminating drop-out prevention and advanced-study programs to accommodate the influx of
new students.
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education be undermined at the expense of "progress"? Accordingly, this
author proposes a statewide mandate be included in Florida's concurrency
law that requires capital expenditures for schools be provided prior to the'
construction of new residential development.
Craig A. Robertson
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